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Abstract
We consider a pure exchange economy with private ownership in which
consumers have interdependent preferences. Hence, consumers’ preferences
are dened on the states of the economy. In a Walras equilibrium for such
an economy, it may, of course, be possible for two or more consumers to si-
multaneously change their net trades and thereby obtain a preferred state.
We use the concept of coordination introduced by Vind (1983) to dene
an exogenously given coordination structure in the economy and dene a
new equilibrium concept, Walras equilibrium with coordination. In such
an equilibrium individual consumers take prices and initial endowments as
given, and consumers do not expect to be able to obtain a preferred state
when they coordinate their choice of net trades. By using the existence
theorem for an equilibrium in a social system with coordination, we set
conditions for the existence of a Walras equilibrium with coordination.
Keywords: Walras equilibrium with coordination, coordination, social sys-
tem, households, incomplete markets.
JEL Classication: D50, D62, D11.
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1 Introduction
We consider a pure exchange economy with private ownership in which consumers
have interdependent preferences. We assume that a state of the economy species
the net trade of each consumer and that consumers’ preferences are dened on
the states of the economy. In a Walras equilibrium for such an economy, it may,
of course, be possible for two or more consumers to simultaneously change their
net trades and thereby obtain a preferred state. In order to allow consumers
to coordinate their net trades, we use the concept of coordination introduced by
Vind (1983) to dene an exogenously given coordination structure in the economy
and to dene a new equilibrium concept, Walras equilibrium with coordination.
Coordination is specied by coordination functions for the consumers and an
approval function. A coordination function for a consumer species for each state
x of the economy and each alternative state y that state the consumer believes
will be the outcome if in state x all consumers c 2 C change their net trades to
y(c). Clearly, a coordination function could specify that the consumer only coor-
dinates with himself or, at the other extreme, that he coordinates with all other
consumers. Typically, each consumer coordinates his net trade with a subset of
the set of consumers. We do not assume that coordination is symmetric, that is,
consumer c may coordinate with d without d coordinating with c. Moreover, two
consumers may coordinate in some commodities and not in others.
In traditional economic theory a household is endowed with a vector of initial
resources and a preference relation which is often assumed to be a total preorder.
However, a household typically has several members. In our formalization of a
household, each member will be endowed with his own initial resources and his
own preference relation. Moreover, each member is described by a coordination
function which may, for example, specify that he coordinates his net trade with
the net trades of all the other members of the household. As we do not allow
members of a household to transfer budgets, our approach leads to a household
decision problem that is dierent from the one discussed in Browning and Chi-
appori (1998) and Gersbach and Haller (1999), for example.
Clearly, to dene an equilibrium state, we also have to specify the set of
consumers who has to approve a change from one state x to another state y. In the
traditional Walras equilibrium, where a consumer (household with a single budget
constraint) only considers his own change of net trade, the change should just
be approved by the consumers who change their net trades; hence, as there is no
coordination, it is enough to look at a deviation by a single consumer (household).
In our formalization, we explicitly have to dene the set of consumers who has
to approve a change. This is done by enlarging the description of the economy
with an approval function. For each state x and each alternative state y, this
function species the set of consumers who has to approve a change from x to
y. Note that, since consumers have dierent coordination functions, they expect
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dierent states to be the outcome of the change from x to y. In the household
example the approval function might, for example, specify that the change has
to be approved by all those consumers who are members of a household where at
least one consumer has changed his net trade.
The market institution we study in this paper is a complete Walrasian mar-
ket. Thus, all commodities have associated prices. We do not allow consumers
to transfer budgets even if they coordinate with other consumers. Hence, a con-
sumer has to choose a net trade with non-positive value at the prevailing prices.
In a Walras equilibrium with coordination, consumers take prices and initial en-
dowments as given, satisfy their budget constraint, and there is market clearing.
Moreover, there does not exist an alternative state y such that each of the con-
sumers who has to approve the change to y satises his budget constraint and
prefers the state which he believes will be the outcome from the change to y.
By using the existence theorem for an equilibrium in a social system with
coordination (Vind 1983 and Keiding 1985), we set conditions for the existence
of a Walras equilibrium with coordination. Apart from the assumptions on the
coordination functions and the approval function, the conditions correspond to
those used for the existence of a Walras equilibrium in an economy with exter-
nalities by Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975). In particular, we do not assume that
preferences are complete or transitive.
The concept of a Walras equilibrium with coordination and the existence re-
sult are interesting not only in terms of the most obvious interpretation, namely
to analyze equilibria in an economy with externalities in consumption. It also
turns out that Walras equilibrium with coordination in partitions is a useful tool
for analyzing economies where consumers have several budget constraints1. By
splitting each of the consumers into as many agents as he has budget constraints,
we obtain a new economy in which each agent has only one budget constraint,
but agents have interdependent preferences even if consumers have independent
preferences. In order to reach an equivalence between the original maximization
problem for a consumer and the maximization problems for the agents corre-
sponding to him in the new economy, we assume that agents coming from the
same consumer coordinate their actions. This tool is used in Grodal and Vind
(1989) to study economies with a much richer set of market institutions.
In an economy where all consumers have independent preferences there is no
need for coordination, and the denition of a Walras equilibrium with coordina-
tion reduces to the denition of a Walras equilibrium. Similarly, if each consumer
only coordinates his choice of net trade with himself a Walras equilibrium with
coordination is a usual Walras equilibrium. In general the set of Walras equi-
libria with coordination depends on the coordination functions as well as the
1When markets are incomplete consumers have several budget constraints; see for example
Due and Shafer (1985).
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approval function. Walras equilibria with coordination will not, in general, be
Pareto optimal even if all consumers coordinate with all other consumers in all
commodities. The reason is that, although the coordination functions allow con-
sumers to coordinate their net trades, consumers have to satisfy their budget
constraints individually.
In section 2, we dene the economy. Section 3 contains the equilibrium de-
nition. The existence theorem is presented in section 4. Section 5 contains some
examples of coordination structures.
2 The economy
We consider a pure exchange economy
E =
(
L; C; Y; (Xc; Pc; ec)c2C ; g

where for all c 2 C
(i) L is a nite set of commodities,
(ii) C is a nite set of consumers,
(iii) Y = RCL is the state space of the economy,
(iv) Xc  Y is the set of net trade states that are feasible for consumer c,
(v) Pc : Xc ! 2Xc is the preference correspondence for consumer c,
(vi) ec : Y  Y ! Y is the coordination function for consumer c,
(vii) g : Y  Y ! 2C is the approval function.
A state x 2 Y species the net trade x(c) 2 RL for each consumer c 2
C. We use the notation x(c; h) for consumer c’s net trade in commodity h 2
L. Apart from the coordination functions ec, c 2 C and the approval function
g, the description of the economy E is the standard one when consumers have
interdependent preferences: Each consumer c is described by the states Xc which
are feasible for him, and a preference correspondence Pc where Pc(x) are the
states preferred by consumer c to the state x. The coordination function ec
species for each state x 2 Y and each alternative state y 2 Y the state ec(x; y)
which consumer c expects to be the outcome when, in state x, the consumer d
has chosen the net trade y(d), d 2 C. Moreover, we assume that there is an
approval function g : Y  Y ! 2C . For each pair of states x; y 2 Y , g(x; y)  C
gives the set of consumers who has to approve the change from x to y.
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We will assume that the coordination functions satisfy the following assump-
tion:
Assumption (Coordination Assumption). For each consumer c 2 C the
coordination function ec : Y  Y ! Y satises
(i) For all (d; h) 2 C  L : ec(x; y)(d; h) =
8<
:
x(d; h) for all x; y 2 Y
or
y(d; h) for all x; y 2 Y
(ii) ec(x; y)(c) = y(c) for all x; y 2 Y
The assumption species the special coordination functions we use in this
paper. The rst part of the assumption states that consumer c 2 C expects
states where consumer d’s net trade in commodity h is d’s old net trade in h for
all states x and alternative states y, or it is d’s new net trade in commodity h.
We say that c coordinates his net trade with the net trade in commodity h of
consumer d if ec(x; y)(d; h) = y(d; h) for all x; y 2 Y . We say that c coordinates
with consumer d if there exists a commodity h such that c coordinates his net
trade with d’s net trade in commodity h. The second part of the assumption
states the natural condition that consumer c coordinates his net trade in all
commodities with himself. It should be noted that we do not assume that the
coordination relation is symmetric or transitive.
Assumption (Feasible Net Trade Assumption).
(A) For all c 2 C the feasible set Xc and the coordination function ec satisfy the
following: for all x 2 \d2CXd and y 2 Y; ec(x; y) 2 Xc ) y 2 Xc.
(B) The feasible sets Xc; c 2 C and the coordination functions ec; c 2 C satisfy
the following: for all x; y 2 \c2CXc; ed(x; y) 2 \c2CXc for all d 2 C.
Assume that, if a consumer c 2 C coordinates with consumer d, he coordinates
with d in all commodities h 2 L. The feasible net trade assumption will then be
satised if, for all c 2 C, the feasible set Xc has the form Xc = X 0c
Q
d6=c R
L for
some X 0c  RL. That is, a state x is feasible for c i c’s net trade is in X 0c. The
assumption is also satised in the following case: Let Rc be the set of consumers
with whom c coordinates and assume that there exist individually feasible sets
of net trades X 0c  RL for c 2 C such that Xc =
Q
d2Rc X
0
d 
Q
d=2Rc R
L. This
last assumption says that a state is feasible for consumer c i all the consumers
with whom he coordinates have net trades in the individually feasible sets of net
trades.
As mentioned above, the approval function g : Y  Y ! 2C species the set
of consumers who has to approve the change from state x to state y. An approval
function g will naturally have the following property: fc 2 C j x(c) 6= y(c)g 
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g(x; y)  fc 2 C j ec(x; y) 6= xg for all x; y 2 Y . This property amounts to
the following: First, all consumers who actually change their net trade should
approve the change. Moreover, only consumers who coordinate with a consumer
who has changed his net trade are included in the set of consumers who has
to approve the change. In the existence theorem in section 5, we assume that
g(x; y) = fc 2 C j ec(x; y) 6= x g for all x; y 2 Y , that is, all consumers who
coordinate with some consumer who changes his net trade have to approve the
change.
3 Walras Equilibrium with Coordination
We shall use the following notation. Let 1 be the vector (1;    ; 1) 2 RCL.
Moreover, let  = fp 2 RL+ j
PL
h=1 ph = 1 g be the non-negative price simplex in
RL.
The denition of feasible states for our economy E is:
Denition (Feasible States). A state x 2 Y is feasible for the economy E if
(i) x 2 \c2CXc and
(ii)
P
c2C x (c)  0
The set of feasible states is denoted F (E)  Y .
Lemma . Assume that fx(c) 2 RL j x 2 Xcg is bounded from below for each
consumer c 2 C. Then there exists K > 0 such that F (E)  inteY where eY =
fx 2 Y j −K1  x  K1g.
Proof. By assumption \c2CXc is bounded below. As, moreover,
P
c2C x(c)  0
for all x 2 F (E) it follows that F (E) is bounded from above.
Denition (Walras Equilibrium with Coordination). A Walras equilibri-
um with coordination in the economy E is a pair (p; x) 2 F (E) consisting of
a price and a feasible state such that
(I) px (c)  0 for all c 2 C,
(II) there does not exist y 2 RCL with y 6= x; such that for all c 2 g (x; y) ;
py (c)  0 and ec (x; y) 2 Pc (x) ;
(III) ph
P
c2C xh(c) = 0 for all h 2 L.
The equilibrium condition (I) states that all consumers take prices as given
and choose a net trade with non-positive value at the given prices. Hence, no
transfer of budget is allowed even if consumers coordinate their net trades. The
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equilibrium (II) condition states that there does not exist a non-empty set of con-
sumers who can simultaneously change their net trades such that all consumers
who have to approve the change expect to obtain a preferred state. The condition
(III) states that the price of a commodity is zero if the aggregate net trade is
negative.
Clearly, if the feasible states and the preferences of a consumer are indepen-
dent (i.e., feasibility and the preferences of a consumer are dened by his own
net trades), then for any coordination functions, a Walras equilibrium with coor-
dination is exactly the same as a Walras equilibrium in the economy where the
coordination functions have been disregarded.
4 The existence theorem
Before stating our existence theorem for the economy E, we introduce the as-
sumption of local non-satiation in E.
Assumption (Local Non-Satiation). For all x 2 X and for all c 2 C and all
open neighborhoods U in RL of x(c) there exists x0 2 U such that letting the state
y 2 Y be dened by y(d) = x(d) for d 6= c and y(c) = x0 then ed(x; y) 2 Pd(x)
for all d with ed(x; y) 6= x. If the assumption is satised for consumer c, we say
that c is locally non-satiated.
The condition states that consumer c can nd a net trade x0 locally such that
he, as well as the consumers that coordinate with him, get a preferred state if c
changes his action from x(c) to x0. Clearly, the condition is satised if all con-
sumers who coordinate with a given consumer are benevolent and each consumer
has monotone preferences or just local non-satiation in his own consumption.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium). Let E be the economy as described above and as-
sume
(i) Xc is closed, convex, 0 2 intXc, and

x (c) 2 RL jx 2 Xc
}
is bounded from
below, for all c 2 C,
(ii) Pc is irreflexive and has open graph and convex values, for all c 2 C,
(iii) all consumers c 2 C are locally non-satiated,
(iv) the coordination assumption is satised,
(v) the feasible net trade assumption is satised,
(vi) for all c 2 C there exists (Xc;Pc) such that Xc  intXc and Pc (x) =
Pc (x) \Xc for all x 2 Xc; and (Xc;Pc) satises (i) and (ii),
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(vii) g (x; y) = fc 2 C jec (x; y) 6= xg for all x; y 2 Y .
Then there exists a Walras equilibrium with coordination in E.
It is well known that the existence of a Walras equilibrium in an economy can
be shown by converting the economy into a social system by adding an agent who
sets prices, using an existence theorem for a Nash equilibrium in the social system,
and nally showing that a Nash equilibrium in the social system is a Walras
equilibrium in the original economy (see Arrow and Debreu 1954 for a proof).
Our proof of the existence of a Walras equilibrium with coordination parallels this
proof. However, we convert our economy with coordination into a social system
with coordination as dened by Vind (1983) and use the existence theorem for
an equilibrium in a social system with coordination by Keiding (1985). The
denition of a social system with coordination and the equilibrium existence
theorem are included in the appendix.
Proof. First, we truncate the economy E. By the lemma there exists a compact
and convex set eY = fx 2 Y j − K1  x  K1g with K > 0 such that F (E) 
int eX. Let eXc = Xc \ eY and let ~E be the corresponding truncated economy. Sec-
ond, we dene the social system with coordination Γ = (A; (Xa; a;Pa; ea)a2A; g)
corresponding to the economy ~E. The agents A are obtained by adding an agent
a = 0 who sets prices, that is, A = C[f0g. The state space for Γ is Y = RLRCL.
The feasible states for agent a 2 C are dened by Xa = RL  eXa and for a = 0
by X0 =   RCL. Let X = \a2AXa. The constraint function a : X ! X
is dened by a(p; x) = f(q; y) 2 X j py(a)  0g for a 2 C. For a = 0 we
let 0(p; x) = X. For all agents a 2 C and all ((p; x)(q; y)) 2 X  X we let
ea((p; x); (q; y)) = (p; ea(x; y)), that is, all consumers use their coordination func-
tions from E and do not coordinate with the price maker2. Note that the deni-
tion of eY together with the assumption (v) imply that ea((p; x); (q; y)) 2 X for all
a 2 C. For a = 0 and all ((p; x)(q; y)) 2 XX we let e0((p; x); (q; y)) = (q; x) 2 X.
That is, the price maker does not coordinate with any of the consumers. Sim-
ilarly, the preferences of agent a 2 C are dened by Pa(p; x) = f(q; y) 2 X j
y 2 Pa(x)g for all (p; x) 2 X. The preferences of the price setter are dened
in the usual way by P0(p; x) = f(q; y) 2 X j q 
P
c2C x(c) > p 
P
c2C x(c)g.
Finally, the approval function g in Γ is dened in the same way as in E, that is,
g((p; x)(q; y)) = fa 2 A j ea((p; x); (q; y)) 6= (p; x)g.
In order to obtain an equilibrium in our social system with coordination, we
have to show that the assumptions of Theorem 2 in the Appendix are satised.
By way of construction we have that eX  RL+CL is non-empty, compact, and
convex. Thus assumption (a) is satised. By denition,  : X  X ! X is
given by (p; x) = \a2Aa(p; x) = f(q; y) 2 X j p  x(c)  0 for all c 2 Cg.
2For notational simplicity, we use the same symbols for the coordination functions of the
consumers and the approval function in Γ and in E.
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Clearly,  has closed and convex values. By assumption (i) the values are non-
empty. Also, the correspondence  is upper hemi continuous. To see that it
is lower hemi continuous, consider (p; x) 2 X, (q; y) 2 (p; x), and a sequence
(pn; xn) 2 X converging to (p; x). By assumption (i) and the construction of eY ,
there exists u << 0 2 eX. Hence, for all n we have pnu(c) < 0 for all c 2 C.
We now construct a sequence yn converging to y with (q; yn) 2 \c2Cc(p; x) by
letting yn = ny + (1 − n)u for suitably chosen weights n 2 [0; 1]. Indeed, if
pn  y(c)  0 for all c 2 C let n = 1, and if pn  y(d) > 0 for some d 2 C let n
be such that maxc2C pn(ny(c) + (1 − n)u) = 0. Clearly, due to the convexity
of \c2C eXc, we have that yn 2 \c2C eXc and hence (q; yn) 2 \c2Cc(p; x). As
(q; yn) 2 0(pn; xn), we obtain (q; yn) 2 (pn; xn). Moreover, as pn converges to
p and p  y(c)  0 for all c 2 C, we have n converging to 1, and yn converging to
y, accordingly. Hence, the lower hemi continuity of  is obtained.
The condition (c) for all a 2 C follows directly from assumption (ii); and for
a = 0 it is trivially satised by the denition of P0.
The condition (d) is fullled for all agents c 2 C by assumption (iv), and by
the denition of e0 for agent a = 0.
To show that (e) is satised for all agents, take any (p; x) 2 X. Consider rst
the agent a = 0 and any (q; y) 2 X. As e0((p; x)(q; y)) 2 0((p; x)) i q 2 
the condition (e) is satised for a = 0. Now consider c 2 C and (q; y) 2 X such
that ec((p; x)(q; y)) 2 c(p; x). As ec((p; x)(q; y))(c) = y(c) by assumption (iv),
we have py(c)  0. Moreover, as (q; y) 2 X, we obtain (q; y) 2 c(p; x). Thus (e)
is satised for all agents a 2 A.
The condition (f’) for agents c 2 C follows immediately from assumption (v)
and our denition of Pc. For the agent a = 0 let 
0 be any open set containing
 and not containing 0. Clearly, the preferences of a = 0 can be extended to
0 RCL. Hence the condition (f’) is satised.
The condition (g) is satised since we dened the coordination functions in
Γ such that no consumer coordinates with a = 0 and the agent a = 0 does not
coordinate with any consumer.
We conclude that there exists an equilibrium state (p; x) 2 X for the social
system Γ. Hence, we have
(1) (p; x) 2 (p; x) and
(2) @(q; y) 2 X such that ea ((p; x); (q; y)) 6= (p; x) for some a 2 A; and
ea ((p
; x); (q; y)) 2 Pa (p; x) \ a (p; x) for a 2 g ((p; x); (q; y)).
We will now show that (p; x) is a Walras equilibrium with coordination in
the original economy E. Clearly, by the denition of X we have that (p; x) 2 
\c2CXc. Hence, to show that x 2 F (E), we only need to show that
P
c2C x
(c) 
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0. First, note that the denition of  and condition (i) yields p  x(c)  0 for all
c 2 C and hence p Pc2C x(c)  0. Now assume that there exists h 2 L such
that
P
c2C x

h(c) > 0. Dene q 2  by qk = 0 for k 6= h and qh = 1 and consider
the state (q; x) 2 X. Clearly, p 6= q as p Pc2C x(c)  0 and q Pc2C x(c) > 0.
Moreover, ec((p
; x); (q; x)) = (p; x) for all c 2 C and e0((p; x); (q; x)) =
(q; x) and hence g((p; x)(q; x)) = f0g. As ((p; x); (q; x)) 2 P0(p; x) \
0(p
; x), we have a contradiction to (2). Thus,
P
c2C x
(c)  0 and hence
x 2 F (E).
Clearly, condition (I) in the denition of a Walras equilibrium with coordina-
tion is also fullled by the denition of c, c 2 C, and (1).
To prove that (II) is satised, assume, conversely, that there exists a state
y 2 Y with y 6= x such that p  y(c)  0 and ec(x; y) 2 Xc \ Pc(x) for all
c 2 g(x; y). First, we prove that y 2 \c2CXc. Indeed, consider c 2 g(x; y). As
x 2 \c2CXc and ec(x; y) 2 Xc, assumption (v) yields y 2 Xc. For c =2 g(x; y) we
have ec(x
; y) = x 2 Xc and hence, again by assumption (v), that y 2 Xc. Hence
x 2 \c2CXc. Moreover, as x 2 F (E)  inteY and \c2CXc is convex, we obtain
that y +(1−)x 2 \c2C eXc for  > 0 suciently small, say, for  = ~ > 0. Let
y0 = ~y+(1−~)x. Then (p; y0) 2 X. We will now show that the state (p; y0) can
be used to violate condition (2) above. Clearly, ea((p
; x); (p; y0)) 6= (p; x) for
a 2 g(x; y). Moreover, g((p; x); (p; y0)) = g(x; y) as 0 =2 g((p; x); (p; y0)).
Consider c 2 g(x; y). As py0(c)  0, we have ec((p; x); (p; y0)) 2 c(p; x).
To show that ec((p
; x); (p; y0)) 2 Pc(p; x), note that assumption (iii) implies
that (p; x) belongs to the boundary of Pc(p; x). Hence, the convexity of
Pc(x) and Xc implies that ~ec((p; x); (p; y)) + (1− ~)(p; x) 2 Pc(p; x). As
~ec((p
; x); (p; y))+ (1− ~)(p; x) = ec((p; x); (p; y0)), we have a violation of
(2).
We will now show that p  Pc2C x(c) = 0. Assume that there exists a
consumer c 2 C for which p  x(c) < 0. Again, by assumption (iii) and F (E) 
int eX , consumer c can nd a net trade y(c) with p  y(c) < 0 such that when c
is the only consumer who changes net trade, we obtain a state (p; y) 2 X with
(p; y) 2 Pc(x; x) \ c(p; x) for all c 2 g((p; x); (p; y)). This contradicts
the fact that (p; x) satises condition (2) above. Hence condition (III) in the
denition of a Walras equilibrium with coordination is satised.
We have now shown that (p; x) is a Walras equilibrium with coordination
in the economy E.
We have already commented on the assumptions (iii), (iv), and (vii) on the
coordination functions and the approval function in Theorem 1. The assumptions
(i) and (ii) are well known from the existence theorems for an ordinary Walras
equilibrium. However, since we allow externalities in the feasible net trade sets,
we assume that 0 is in the interior of the set of feasible net trade states Xc for
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all c 2 C. In section 2 we discussed the feasible net trade assuption and gave
two examples of sets Xc, c 2 C such that the assumption was satised. In both
cases we obtain 0 2 intXc, for all c 2 C, if 0 is in the interior of their individually
feasible net trade sets X 0c for all c 2 C. The assumption that 0 2 intXc can, of
course, be replaced by the assumption that 0 2 Xc by introducing the concept of
a quasi Walras equilibrium with coordination and only proving the existence of
such equilibria. The assumption (vi) states that the preferences of all consumers
are well behaved on the boundary of their feasible net trade sets.
5 Special cases
In this section we consider some examples of coordination functions and approval
functions. We assume that the coordination assumption is satised. Moreover,
we assume that if a consumer c 2 C coordinates with a consumer d 2 C then
he coordinates with d in all commodities h 2 L. In this case an alternative way
to describe the coordination function ec is to specify a coordination relation R
on C  C, where c R d i c coordinates with d. By assumption R is reflexive.
Let Rc = fd 2 C j c R dg be the consumers with whom c coordinates. Thus,
ec(x; y) = ((y(d))d2Rc; (x(d))d=2Rc).
We say that coordination is symmetric i R is symmetric. Also, we say that
coordination is transitive i R is transitive. Given a coordination relation R,
an approval function g : Y  Y ! Y can be generated in the following way.
Consider for each c 2 C the set R−1c = fd 2 C j d R cg. R−1c are all consumers d
who coordinate their net trade with c. The approval function g used in Theorem
1 is given by g(x; y) = [fc2Cjx(c)6=y(c)gR−1c for all x; y 2 Y . Clearly, we could,
in general, have dened an approval structure as a family (Bc)c2C based on the
interpretation that a state in which consumer c has changed his net trade has
to be approved by consumers in Bc. Naturally, c 2 Bc for all c. Moreover, we
assume Bc  R−1c because only these consumers coordinate their net trade with
c and are therefore informed about c’s new net trade. Consequently, we dene an
approval structure as a family (Bc)c2C with fcg  Bc  R−1c for all c 2 C. The
approval function g corresponding to the approval structure (Bc)c2C is dened
by g(x; y) = [fc2Cjx(c)6=y(c)gBc for all x; y 2 Y .
5.1 No coordination
No coordination means that the coordination is given by the coordination relation
R where c R d i c = d. Thus, for any state x and alternative state y, consumer c
believes that the state in which he is the only one who has changed his net trade
from x(c) to y(c) will be the outcome. As c 2 Bc  R−1c , the approval structure
must be given by Bc = fcg. Clearly, condition (II) in the denition of a Walras
equilibrium with coordination in this case states that there is no consumer c who
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can nd a y(c) 2 RL with py(c)  0 such that ((x(d))d6=c; y(c)) 2 Pc(x). Thus, if
there is no coordination in E, a Walras equilibrium with coordination is indeed a
traditional Walras equilibrium.
5.2 Coordination in a partition
Remark 1. Coordination according to the relation R is symmetric and transitive
if and only if the family (Rc)c2C is a partition of C.
Coordination in a partition can be used to model the decision problem in an
economy with households. Typically, a household consists of several consumers
whose preferences are interdependent. Hence let us assume that the set of con-
sumers is divided into households and that the coordination relation is given by
coordination in the partition of households. We still have to specify the approval
structure. Assume that the approval structure is the one considered in Theo-
rem 1, i.e. Bc = R
−1
c = Rc for all c 2 C. Condition (I) in the denition of a
Walras equilibrium with coordination in this economy states that each member
of a household individually has to satisfy the budget constraint. Condition (II)
states that there is no households whose members can nd new net trades sat-
isfying their budget constraints such that all members of the household prefer
the state in which they obtain the new net trades. For example, it is impossible
to improve the situation of the members of a household by their simultaneously
stopping smoking or starting drinking. Note that the Walras equilibria with coor-
dination in this economy are exactly the same as the ones in the economy where
all members of a household have identical preferences given by the intersection of
the preference correspondences of the household members. Indeed, when there is
coordination in a partition, then ed(x; y) = ec(x; y) for all d; c in the same element
of the partition. Hence, condition II in the denition of a Walras equilibrium with
coordination is satised i there does not exist an element F in the partition and
net trades (y(c))c2F with the property that py(c)  0 and ec(x; y) 2 \d2FPd(x)
for all c 2 F .
Clearly, the equilibrium concept becomes weaker if a given approval structure
is enlarged. The existence theorem in this paper assumes that Bc = R
−1
c = Rc,
that is, the largest possible approval structure is assumed. However, it should
be noted that if we had considered approval structures (B0c) such that B
0
c  Bc,
then there would not necessarily exist a Walras equilibrium with coordination.
Consider, for example, an economy with two consumers C = f1; 2g and two
commodities, and the coordination relation i R j for i; j 2 C. Let X1 = X2 =
X = (R2+−f!g) (R2+−f!g) for some ! 2 R2+ and let the consumers preference
correspondences be given by ui : X ! X with gradxjui 6= 0 for all i; j 2 C. When
the approval structure is B1 = f1g and B2 = f2g, we can easily choose u1 and u2
such that the rst order conditions for a Walras equilibrium with coordination
are inconsistent.
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5.3 Complete coordination
Complete coordination is the coordination relation R for which c R d for all c; d 2
C and approval structure Bc = C for all c 2 C. Hence for all c 2 C the
coordination function is given by ec(x; y) = y, and the approval function is given
by g(x; y) = C for all x; y 2 Y . Note, that even with complete coordination,
Walras equilibria with coordination is not, in general, Pareto optimal. The reason
is that consumers have individual budget constraints, and without independence
some transfer of budgets might be advantageous for all agents.
5.4 Arbitrary coordination structures
Clearly, there are many interpretations where coordination structures that are
not symmetric or transitive are natural. In a hierarchical structure, or when
consumers choose sequentially, coordination is not symmetric. Moreover, assume
that we have households and coordination within households, but that, in ad-
dition, consumers have partner relations with other consumers, creating further
coordination for some consumers. In this case, we will typically have a situation
in which coordination is not transitive.
In general there is no trivial connection between Walras equilibria in an econ-
omy and Walras equilibria with coordination when the description of the ba-
sic economy has been enlarged with a coordination relation R and an approval
structure (Bc)c2C . Consider, however, the case where Bc = fcg for all c 2 C
and hence g(x; y) = fc 2 C j x(c) 6= y(c)g. Clearly, here the set of equilib-
ria with coordination is a subset (possibly empty) of the set of Walras equi-
libria. Coordination might, also enlarge the set of equilibria, though3. Con-
sider again an economy with C = f1; 2g. Let X1 = (RL+ − f!1g)  RL and
X2 = (RL+ − f!1g) (RL+ − f!2g) with !i 2 RL+ for i = 1; 2. Let the consumers’
preference correspondences be given by the utility functions u1 : X1 ! R with
u1(x(1); x(2)) = v1(x(1)) for some strictly monotone function v1 : RL+−f!1g ! R,
and u2 : X2 ! R with u2(x(1); x(2)) = v2(x(2))−v1(x(1)) for some strictly mono-
tone function v2 : RL+ − f!2g ! R. Assume that R1 = f1g and R2 = f1; 2g and
that Bc = R
−1
c for c 2 C. Hence B1 = f1; 2g and B2 = f2g. Clearly, in this
example, the set of Walras equilibria is a subset of the Walras equilibria with
coordination. However, the set of Walras equilibria with coordination is much
larger than the set of Walras equilibria. We will show that (p; x) 2   Y is
a Walras equilibrium with coordination if x(2) is a maximal element for v2 in
fx 2 RL+ − f!2g j px  0g and x(1) = −x(2) 2 RL+ − f!1g. Clearly, x is
feasible. Moreover, as v2 is strictly monotone, we have p
x(2) = 0 and hence
px(1) = 0. Thus, condition I is satised. Condition III is trivially satised as
x(1) + x(2) = 0. Now assume that condition II is violated. Hence there exists
3It can easily be shown that, in general, this holds with the type of preferences used in the
next example.
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y 6= x such that py(c)  0 and ec(x; y) 2 Pc for c 2 g(x; y). First, assume
that y(2) = x(2). Hence g(x; y) = B1 = f1; 2g. However, by denition of x(2)
we cannot have e1(x
; y) 2 P1(x) and e2(x; y) 2 P2(x). Second, assume that
y(1) = x(1). Thus, g(x; y) = B2 = f2g and again the denition of x(2) results
in a contradiction. Last, consider the case where y(1) 6= x(1) and y(2) 6= x(2).
Then, as py(1)  0, py(2)  0 , and g(x; y) = f1; 2g, the denition of x(2)
again implies that it is impossible to have e1(x
; y) = (y(1); x(2)) 2 P1(x) and
e2(x
; y) = y 2 P2(x). Again we have a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that
(p; x) is a Walras equilibrium with coordination. Note, that if, in the exam-
ple, we use the approval structure Bc = fcg for c 2 C, then the set of Walras
equilibria with coordination is identical to the set of Walras equilibria.
6 Appendix: A Social System with Coordina-
tion
This section repeats concepts from Vind (1983) and repeats the existence theorem
for an equilibrium in Vind (1983) with the assumptions in the improved version
in Keiding (1985).
A social system with coordination is an indexed family
Γ =
(
A; (Xa; a;Pa; ea)a2A ; g

;
where
- A is a nite set of agents,
- Xa  R` are the feasible states for agent a. The state space X of the system
is dened as X = \a2AXa,
- a : X ! 2X gives for each x 2 X, the set, a(x), of states which are
attainable for agent a. The correspondence  : X ! 2X is dened as (x) =
\a2Aa(x),
- Pa : X ! 2X is the preference correspondence of agent a 2 A,
- ea : X X ! X is the coordination function of a 2 A,
- g : X X ! 2A is the approval function.
Denition (Equilibrium). An equilibrium in the social system with coordina-
tion is a state x 2 X such that
(1) x 2  (x) and
(2) @y 2 X such that ea (x; y) 6= x for some a 2 A; and ea (x; y) 2
Pa (x
) \ a (x) for a 2 g (x; y).
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Theorem 2. Let
(
A;X; (a;Pa; ea)a2A ; g

be a social system with coordination
such that for all a 2 A and for all x 2 X
(a) X is a non-empty, convex, compact subset of R`,
(b)  is continuous with closed, convex and non-empty values,
(c) Pa has open graph, convex values and x =2 Pa (x),
(d) ea is continuous, ea (x; ) is ane, and ea (x; x) = x,
(e) ea (x; y) 2 a (x) ) y 2 a (x),
(f’) there exists a convex and compact set Xa with X  intXa and a correspon-
dence Pa : Xa ! Xa which is irreflexive with open graph and convex (possibly
empty) values such that Pa(x) = Pa(x) \ X for all x 2 X,
(g) g (x; y) = fa 2 A jea (x; y) 6= xg.
Then there exists an equilibrium in Γ.
Proof. See Corollary 1 in Keiding (1985)4.
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